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AN ESSAY ON THE SPIRIT OF LIBERTY
IN THE FOG OF WAR
Patrick Baude*
Linda Greenhouse must be right when she writes in the New York
Times that the Guantanamo detainees' cases' are shaping up as a question of turf between the Executive and the Supreme Court.2 Although
the Court has not heard argument at the time of this symposium, both
the lower court cases and the general commentary suggest that the
cases will be decided within a "standard conception" ofjudicial power
in wartime. That standard conception begins with the proposition
that a sacrifice of civil liberties is a necessary component of enhanced
national security in times of great struggle, especially war or warlike
times, or even times of metaphorical war (like the Cold War.) The
second part of the standard conception is that federal courts, being
the primary guardians of individual liberties, must accordingly reduce
their active role for the duration of the war or metaphor. But finally,
since the goal of the war is for normality to return some day, the
courts should preserve their power by its sparing exercise. Some, like
Michael Paulsen in this symposium, 3 find sanction for this outcome in
constitutional interpretation-making it possible to preserve the rhetoric that the courts do fully safeguard the eternal constitutional flame,
so long as we understand the true nature of that flame. Others, like
Richard Posner, argue from a consistent pragmatic position that win* Ralph F. Fuchs Professor of Law and Public Service, Indiana University,
Bloomington. The author is grateful to Professors Patricia Bellia, Daniel Conkle,
Robert Rodes, and Jeffrey Stake for helpful comments, and to Darren Craig for
research assistance.
1 See, e.g., Gherebi v. Bush, 352 F.3d 1278, 1288-89 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that
federal district courts have jurisdiction over enemy combatants' habeas petitions); Al
Odah v. United States, 321 F.3d 1134 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (holding that aliens in military
custody outside of U. S. territory do not have due process rights and therefore cannot
seek habeas relief in the courts of the United States), cert. granted sub nom. Rasul v.
Bush, 124 S. Ct. 534 (2003).
2 Linda Greenhouse, It's a Question of Federal Turf N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 12, 2003, at
Al.
3 See Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Constitution of Necessity, 79 NoTRE DAME L. REV
1257 (2004).
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ning wars when necessary is an essential part of constitutional protection. 4 For these writers, courts in wartime are not really
compromising their constitutional function, which is properly understood as always involving a pragmatic consideration of their actions on
the entire system. Pragmatism, as Richard Posner writes, is unprincipled "only if it is thought to entail the disregard of the systemic as well
as immediate consequences of judicial decisions, which no pragmatist
judge worth his salt believes."' 5 Yet others, like William Rehnquist,
find a sustained judgment of history that courts in fact stand down in
times of crisis-an argument inevitably bolstered by an analysis of
Abraham Lincoln's justly celebrated and prophetic greatness. 6 Predicting the future five years ago, Rehnquist wrote:
It is neither desirable nor is it remotely likely that civil liberty will
occupy as favored a position in wartime as it does in peacetime. But
it is both desirable and likely that more careful attention will be
paid by the courts to the basis for the government's claims of necessity as a basis for curtailing civil liberty. The laws thus will not be
silent in time of war, but they will speak with a somewhat different
7
voice.
If I am right about this standard conception, the main lines of the
forthcoming Supreme Court decision are easy to foresee (however
foolish of me it may be to commit these thoughts to print at this particular moment). Both cases arise because about six hundred prisoners were taken captive in a military action against terrorists. The
captives are detained by U.S. military authorities at the naval base at
Guantanamo Bay, a part of Cuba which is under a long-term lease to
the United States. The exact legal situation of these prisoners with
respect to international law is a point thoroughly discussed in several
contributions to this symposium. The important thing for domestic
constitutional law is that they have been denied the right to consult
with lawyers, and there are no executive plans to involve the judicial
power of the United States in any way at all in connection with their
imprisonment.
The detainees (in a suit brought by "next friends" as self-appointed proxies are called in habeas actions) have taken cases to two
different federal circuits. Habeas corpus, in cases like this, is an at4

Richard A. Posner, Security Versus Civil Liberties, ATLANTIC
See e.g.,

MONTHLY,

Dec. 2001, at 46.
5 Richard A. Posner, PragmatismVersus Purposivism in FirstAmendment Analysis, 54
STAN.

6

L. REV. 737, 738 (2002).

But as Daniel Farber observes: "To expect another Lincoln would be foolish."

DANIEL FARBER, LINCOLN'S CONSTITUTION 200

7

WILLIAM

H.

(2003).

REHNQUIST, ALL THE LAWS BUT ONE

224-25 (1998).
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tempt by the prisoner to invoke the jurisdiction of an Article III
court-i.e., the 'judicial power of the United States," in determining
the legality and conditions of imprisonment. In other cases, where
the government seeks to imprison terrorists or enemies as "criminals"
under domestic law, the government itself invokes federal judicial jurisdiction by filing an indictment. In such criminal proceedings, the
crucial question is the extent to which the courts should defer to executive branch decisions, as in the Moussaoui case, another question still
pending in the lower courts. 9 In cases like Moussaoui, all parties concede that the courts must decide the questions-they may disagree
mainly on what the sources for decision should be, questioning the
relative weights of judicial precedent, legislative action (or inaction)
and, above all, presidential and military orders and findings. These
are also rich questions raising other concerns about what I have been
calling the "standard conception." But these disputes are in the familiar pattern of almost all ordinary exercises ofjudicial power-it is the
duty of the courts to say "what the law is."1

The Guantanamo cases, however, are in a different mold. Here
the Administration says the courts have absolutely no role at all to
play-relying especially on the Supreme Court's 1950 decision in
Johnson v. Eisentrager.1 That case held that nonresident aliens detained outside the United States simply had no constitutional rights
and, accordingly, there was no jurisdiction in a habeas corpus action
to entertain any kind of due process challenge to their detention,
punishment or execution. In terms of practical outcomes in the immediate lives of real people (as opposed to pundits or professors),
there may be little difference between saying, as in Eisentrager,that the
prisoners have no rights rather than, as in Moussaoui, that of course
they have rights, it's just that the courts won't give them any rights
unless the President wants them to. (A distinction whose triviality was
perhaps famously, if inadvertently, revealed by Justice Minton's statement that immigrant aliens had received due process because
"[w]hatever the procedure authorized by Congess is, it is due process"' 2 (pace John Marshall).) The District of Columbia relied on
Eisentragerin denying habeas jurisdiction, whereas the Ninth Circuit
8 U. S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
9 See United States v. Moussaoui, 336 F.3d 279 (4th Cir. 2003) (denying rehearing en banc of a lower court decision that sanctioned the government for not allowing the defendant to depose witnesses in government custody pursuant to a court
order).
10 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
11 339 U.S. 763 (1950).
12 United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 544 (1950).

1324

NOTRE DAME

LAW

REVIEW

[VOL. 79:4

concluded that the special status of the Guantanamo Naval Base
placed it within U.S. sovereignty. 13 The Administration has argued in
the Supreme Court that the judicial branch simply has no power at all
to act if the executive branch has not sought its aid in imprisoning the
terrorist: "[T]he scope of those rights or procedures are to be determined by the Executive and the military, and not the courts. 1 4 It is
this argument, of absolute and unchecked power in a matter of fundamental importance and widespread public interest, that seems to
question the "standard conception."
The Court will begin by describing the issue as a question ofjurisdiction to adjudicate the rights of the detainees. This seems obvious,
especially given the opinion in the District of Columbia Court of Appeals, which relied on Eisentrager,in concert with the wording of the
basic habeas corpus statute (authorizing federal judges to issue the
writ "within their respectivejurisdictions'1 5 ) to hold that persons captured
and detained outside the United States are also outside the habeas
jurisdiction conferred on Article III courts. 16 The Supreme Court will
say that this interpretation of the statute raises, in this case, grave or
serious constitutional doubts, citing Marbury v. Madison17 for sure and
probably a list of cases ending with Immigration and NaturalizationService v. St. Cyr.18 To avoid the necessity of confronting these grave
doubts, the Court will distinguish Guantanamo from Germany (the
locus of detention in Eisentrager) by pointing out that the United
States is de facto sovereign in Guantanamo, whereas the World War II
post-war theater involved many sovereign nations exercising coordinated international control.
Having established jurisdiction, the Court will then assert that
Guantanamo is not at all like the other places governed by the United
States. Unlike the state of Indiana during the Civil War, there are no
civil courts open in Guantanamo, and the constitutional limits on military power applied in Ex parteMilligan19 therefore do not apply. Having due regard to the needs of national security in a war-like time, to
13 See Al Odah v. United States, 321 F.3d 1134, 1140 (D.C. Cir. 2003); Gherebi v.
Bush, 352 F.3d 1278, 1288-89 (9th Cir. 2003)
14 Brief of the United States in Opposition at 26, Rasul v. Bush, Al Odah v. United
States, 142 S. Ct. 534 (2003) (Nos. 03-334, 03-343)
15 See 28 U.S.C. § 2241(a) (2000) (emphasis added).
16 Al Odah, 321 F.3d at 1145.
17 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
18 533 U.S. 289 (2001) (holding that the U.S. District Court for the District of
Connecticut had jurisdiction over an alien's habeas petition).
19 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866) (holding that the military commission did not have
the authority to try, convict, and sentence the defendant because he was not a member of the military nor a prisoner of war)
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the practical difficulties of determining whether the detainees really
are enemy combatants, and to the fact that the procedures finally announced in March of 200220 meet fundamental principles of due process as balanced under the test of, say, Mathews v. Eldridge,2' the Court
will then direct the petitions to be dismissed. The editorial pages of
the establishment press will opine somberly about the Solomonic
character of Chief Justice Rehnquist's (surely) opinion. Liberals will
22
be delighted that the Court did not blindly follow Ex parte Quirin,
which approved the actual execution of enemy combatants, including
a U.S. citizen, without any substantive habeas review, and the Department of Defense will note, with pragmatic satisfaction, that it can do
exactly what it wants so long as it doesn't say exactly what it thinks.
The law journals will fill up with condemnations of the Supreme
Court for its abdication of the fundamental role of protecting the
powerless from arbitrary authority-is there, after all, a more literal
example of being discrete and insular than to be locked up in Guantanamo? I am myself delighted to have this first opportunity to explain
that the hypothetical opinion I have described is terribly wrong, but
for different reasons. And this error lies at the crossroads of what is
wrong in the general understanding of the problem of civil liberties in
war-like times. My critique is not based on a novel or original theory.
It results in part from reflections on Justice Robert Jackson's dissenting opinion in Korematsu,23 particularly in what we can now know
about its historical context. And it results in part from revisiting
Learned Hand's often quoted-but rarely taken seriously-statement
about the place of courts in a free society:
I often wonder whether we do not rest our hopes too much upon
constitutions, upon laws and upon courts. These are false hopes;
believe me, these are false hopes. Liberty lies in the hearts of men
and women; when it dies there, no constitution, no law, no court
can save it; no constitution, no law, no court can even do much to
20 See Procedures for Trials by Military Commissions of Certain Non-United States
Citizens in the War Against Terrorism, 68 Fed. Reg. 39,374 (2003).
21 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). Eldridge held that due process is determined by
balancing
the private interest that will be affected by the official action ... the risk of
an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and
the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards;
and finally, the Government's interest, including the function involved and
the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.
Id. at 335.
22 317 U.S. 1 (1942).
23 Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 242 (1944) (Jackson,J., dissenting).
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help it. While it lies there it needs no constitution, no law, no court
24
to save it.
What's missing from Hand's dichotomy is what a court should do
when the spirit of liberty is something between flourishing and dead,
which I think would be a consensus diagnosis of today's political situation. It seems sometimes that these two important and moving texts
of Jackson and Hand are often dismissed as merely eloquent. A standard rap against RobertJackson is that the elegance of his prose made
his ideas sound better than they were. Justice Jackson himself expressed a similar sense when, comparing Learned to his cousin, Judge
Augustus Hand, he advised federal judges to "quote Learned, but fol25
low Gus."
The first step in my critique is this: as a matter of reality, the Supreme Court lacks both the real power and the practical decisionmaking judgment necessary to compel the President's action in
circumstances thought to imperil the nation's fundamental safety.
This is a contingent factual claim, which I cannot prove. It is quite
possible that the Supreme Court could order the discharge of all the
detainees at Guantanamo and the President would meekly comply.
Factually, compliance might be ready since it appears that there may
no longer be a compelling reason to continue. 2 6 It is certainly possible that any political authority would find unacceptable the domestic
political damage of defying the Supreme Court. In some respects, this
is no easier to know than it is to answer the question why Richard
Nixon didn't simply burn the Watergate tapes when he first got the
subpoena. If the Supreme Court were to order something more crucial to the Administration's political survival, say bail for Saddam Hussein, the political calculation might be different. In the Guantanamo
case, I think the decisive question leading to near certainty that the
Court will not actually free these prisoners is mainly the question of
practical decisionmaking. It is difficult to conceive of courts making a
decision whether there exists in actual fact a compelling government
interest in continued detention of these particular people at this particular moment-it would take the courts as long to find enough
Arabic, Farsi, and Pashto translators as it has taken the Federal Bureau
of Investigation.
24

LEARNED HAND,

The Spirit of Liberty, in THE

SPIRIT OF LIBERTY

189, 189-90 (Ir-

ving Dilliard ed., 1952).
25 James Oakes, PersonalReflections on Learned Hand and the Second Circuit, 47 STAN.
L. REV. 387, 389 (1995) (citation omitted).
26 See Neil A. Lewis, U.S. Negotiating to Release Many Held at Guantanamo, N.Y.
TIMES,

Jan. 10, 2004, at A5.
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My second step is to argue that, in consequence, it is misleading
to take jurisdiction in theory in order to defer in fact. For one thing,
future judges might be misled about the state of the law, or at least
faced with difficult precedents. This is at the core of Justice Jackson's
dissent in Korematsu. The majority opinion upheld a conviction for
violating a race based command to evacuate the West coast during
World War 11.27 The majority upheld the conviction, as a result of
accepting executive judgments that there was the equivalent of a compelling interest. 28 Justice Jackson would not have reviewed the order
on its merits but would have forbidden the federal courts to play any
part in its enforcement; "once a judicial opinion rationalizes such an
order... or rather rationalizes the Constitution... the principle then
lies about like a loaded weapon .. ".."29
As least with respect to that
particular decision, history has been more ashamed than misled. As
Dennis Hutchinson has recently shown compellingly, lawyers and
30
courts have not relied on Korematsu.
Ironically, Justice Jackson was dissuaded from publishing his separate opinion in the Quiin case, and this is the case that seems to be
the loaded gun currently in use. In Ex parte Quirin, the Supreme
Court, in an emergency hearing, upheld death sentences given to
Nazi saboteurs by a military commission. 31 The Supreme Court issued
a brief notice upholding the military commission's action and then,
after the executions had taken place and the Court had studied the
matter more carefully, found considerable difficulty in writing an actual opinion.3 2 The resulting patched quilt of an opinion is the principal authority for the current military commissions. Justice Jackson
drafted an opinion, the heart of which was to appear in Korematsu.
His basic point was that military measures ordered by the President
should neither be reviewed by the Courts nor enforced by them:
[I]n the long run, it seems to me that we have no more important
duty than to keep clear and separate the lines of responsibility and
duty of the judicial and of the executive-military arms of government .... If we are uncompromisingly to discountenance military
intervention in civil justice, we would do well to refuse to meddle

27

Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 223-24.

28

Id.

29 Id. at 246 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
30 DennisJ. Hutchinson, "The Achilles Heel" of the Constitution:Justice
Jackson and the
JapaneseExclusion Cases, 2002 Sup. CT. REv. 455.
31 317 U.S. 1 (1942).
32 See Louis FISHER, NAzI SABOTEURS ON TRIAL 109-21 (2003).
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with military measures dealing with captured unlawful enemy
33
belligerents.
The political self-confidence and constitutional assurance with
which the current administration has articulated and defended the
essentially standardless detentions in Guantanamo might seem much
less chilling if the Court in Quirin, following Jackson, had simply declined to interfere with, rather than upholding, the decision to kill the
saboteurs.
It is a mistake, however, to focus too much on the future use of a
Supreme Court precedent. The opinion also plays an important role
in the politics of the moment. The beliefs and arguments of doubters
within the administration itself will be eroded (or worse) if the Supreme Court upholds a measure challenged on constitutional
grounds. Imagine a rising young adviser in the Departments of State
or Justice, who argues that the detentions in Guantanamo are a violation of, say, the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. The
surest way to end this adviser's future influence would be for the
Court to assume jurisdiction and find that the clause had not been
violated. If the Court declines to take jurisdiction in a way that makes
plain that only the officials of the executive branch can make that
determination, the adviser survives to advise again.
An important corollary of the standard conception that civil liberties must be surrendered in time of war is that our greatest challenge
is to surrender them only temporarily, so that we may regain them
afterwards. As Rehnquist writes: "the maxim [inter armes silent leges]
speaks to the timing of a judicial decision on a question of civil liberties in wartime. If a decision is made after hostilities have ceased, it is
more likely to favor civil liberty than if made while hostilities continue." 3 4 There are two different ways of denying the usefulness of
this analysis in the Guantanamo cases.
First, one could question the truth of the underlying historical
proposition. Mark Tushnet has recently spelled out a good case for
skepticism here. 35 In some ways, war has been the engine of creating
civil liberties rather than destroying them. The obvious cases are the
way the Revolutionary War brought the Bill of Rights or the Civil War
the Fourteenth Amendment. There are subtler but more interesting
33 Id. at 116 (citing an undated draft found in justice Jackson's papers at the
Library of Congress).
34 REHNQUIST, supra note 7, at 224 (1998).
35 See Mark Tushnet, DefendingKorematsu ?: Reflections on Civil Liberties in Wartime,
2003 Wis. L. REv. 273.
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cases as well. Some observers see Brown v. Board of Education3 6 as a
step to improve the United States' image in the developing world during the Cold War3 7 and the effect of the Vietnam War experience on
38
individual rights is a complex and disputable one.

Second, one could challenge the applicability of the wartime
analogy to the current government actions against terrorism. The war
against terrorism is certainly not a war in the international sense of a
violent armed conflict between nations-the Guantanamo detainees
are not prisoners of the acknowledged war against Iraq, after all. And
the "war on terrorism" may never end whereas the war in Iraq will
have to, sometime, somehow. So, if the war never ends, then the suspension of rights is permanent.
Neither of these critiques is directly tied to the case I am trying to
develop here. The problem with the "standard conception" of civil
rights in wartime, especially as articulated by William Rehnquist, is
that it has become a subpart of the doctrine ofjudicial supremacy, as
articulated by the Rehnquist Court. The earlier idea of judicial
supremacy, as expressed in such cases as Cooper v. Aaron,3 9 was the
limited claim that, in matters resolved by a judicial case within Article
III, the states and political branches of the federal government were
bound to respect what the courts had decided. 40 Even this limited
claim is not self-evidently right or explicit in our constitutional text or
early traditions, but that is a question for another day.
A striking recent example is the Court's opinion in the Commerce Clause case of Lopez v. United States,41 invalidating a federal stat42
ute which prohibited possession of a firearm near a school.
Congress had adopted the statute in the name of the Commerce
Clause, a decision which could be defended either because there is a
substantial commerce in firearms or because the possession of firearms by students, taken as a whole, harms education and thus the economic future of other students. 43 The Court was convinced that the
36 347 U.S. 483 (holding that separate educational facilities based on race were
inherently unequal, and that segregation violated the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment).
37

See

MARY

L.

DUDZIAK, COLD WAR AND CIVIL RIGHTS: RACE AND THE IMAGE OF

101-09 (2000).
38 See Michael R. Belknap, The Warren Court and the Vietnam War: The Limits of
Legal Liberalism, 33 GA. L. REv. 65, 121-25 (1998) (noting that the Warren Court's
typical legal liberalism did not extend to matters involving the Vietnam War).
39 358 U.S. 1 (1958).
40 Id. at 24.
41 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
42 Id. at 561.
43 Id. at 563-64.
AMERICAN DEMOCRACY
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Commerce Clause must have a judicially enforceable limit, without
much regard for either the language or the history of the Constitution.44 Those ideas upholding the statute, the majority said, were not
illogical but had no enforceable limits-therefore they could not be
constitutional principles. 45 "The actual limiting principle ... [is] the

'46
weirdly circular proposition that there must be a limiting principle.
The point, in other words, is not just that the Court should enforce
the Constitution: the Constitution's meaning must be adjusted so as to
make it capable of enforcement. So we are left, under Article I, Section 8, with the peculiar result that Congress cannot ban guns from
schools because the commerce in guns poses a hazard to education
but can, probably, ban a gun from school if the prosecutor can prove
that the particular gun at issue moved, however harmlessly, in commerce once upon a time. 47 The only benefit of this rule is that it gives
the Court something to do while Congress passes legislation. In a recent essay, Mark Tushnet has also shown how the driving force in interpreting Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment has become
maintaining judicial supremacy rather than finding the actual mean48
ing of the section.
My central concern with this standard conception as applied to
wartime, then, is this: a "Supreme" Court can no longer say that, when
the going gets tough, it will let the President make crucial decisions
about human rights, torturing or interrogating or detaining whomever he thinks necessary for the survival of the republic. Instead, the
courts must make that decision. But when they do, when they reach
the inescapable conclusion that winning a war of survival is the only
possible conclusion, they will have to reason their way backwards to
that conclusion by saying that the Constitution is not violated because
our rights aren't really that protected. Here it is the majority opinion
in Korematsu4 9 that is illustrative. We need not review the details here,
as so much excellent description of that case is now available. 50 The
important point here is that the government, with limited reason, im-

44 Id. at 552-53.
45 Id. at 564.
46 Louise Weinberg, Fearand Federalism, 23 OHIO N.U. L. REv. 1295, 1393 (1997).
47 The current version of the Gun Free School Zones Act, 18 U.S.C. § 9 22(q)
(2000), recognizes that "the occurrence of violent crime in school zones has resulted
in a decline in the quality of education in our country." Id.
48 Mark Tushnet, The Story of Boerne v. Flores: Federalism, Rights, and Judicial
Supremacy, in CONSTITUTIONAL LAW STORIES 521-27 (Michael Dorf ed., 2004).
49 323 U.S. 214, 214-24 (1944).
50 See, e.g.,
ERIc K. YAMAMOTO ET AL., RACE, RIGHTS AND REPARATION: LAW AND THE
JAPANESE AMERICAN INTERNMENT

134-53

(2001).
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prisoned U.S. citizens based on their race. 5 1 Justice Black's opinion
for the Court found this action to be constitutional because racial discrimination could be justified by "pressing public necessity. '52 Although the words have evolved slightly (we now say "compelling
public interest"), and the meaning greatly, the subsequent texture of
equal protection doctrine has remained so that even invidious racial
discrimination is not per se unconstitutional-and not because the
Court thought or explained why that interpretation of the Fourteenth
Amendment made sense, but only because it was unwilling to say that
such matters should be resolved, in wartime, elsewhere. Watering
rights down to preserve them in court is only a desirable strategy when
the court is the only body to be legitimately concerned with themthis is the tragic face of judicial supremacy.
The Supreme Court may lack the power, in the positivist sense, to
compel action by a wartime President, but it is not without cultural
power. What courts do have in this situation is the power to make
things clear, the power to make plain where responsibility actually lies.
This is not a trivial power and it is the middle excluded from Learned
Hand's false dichotomy. 53 Judge Hand should have added: "When

the spirit of liberty lives in danger, a court is needed to assign responsibility for its rescue." Perhaps Learned Hand's advice about the
spirit of liberty is so little heeded because most of our civic life is lived
in ordinary times, when liberty is neither at great risk nor especially
safe. Wartime may be, however, the limiting case to test the importance of this counsel. The important intellectual task, and the critical
insight of Hand's observation, is to separate the question of civil liberties from the power of the courts. Observations that the courts have,
or pragmatically should have, less power in wartime, while no doubt
quite prudent or even true, do not necessarily mean that our civil liberties are, or should be, impaired.
Probably the showcase, though, for the standard conception is
the way the Korematsu case is remembered and taught in American law
schools-certainly the way I taught it before I read Patrick Gudridge's
recent study of the Endo case. 54 Korematsu is seen as a case in which
the Supreme Court was forced to accept racist imprisonment of American citizens in the face of overwhelming necessity to express confi51
52
53

See Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 220-21.
Id. at 216.
See supra note 24 and accompanying text.

54 Ex parte Endo, 323 U.S. 283 (1944); see Patrick 0. Gudridge, Remember Endo?,
116 HARv. L. REv. 1933, 1939 (2003) (arguing that Endo is just as much a part of
constitutional history as Korematsu).
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dence in the President. 55 This interpretation fits nicely with the view
that courts do the best they can with civil liberties, and is often fortified by the accurate observation that the idea of strict scrutiny expressed but inadequately applied in Justice Black's opinion was a
doctrinal source of our postwar liberation from racial discrimination
in peacetime. 56 (A similar argument, 57 albeit in a different context, is
sometimes made about Justice Holmes's opinion in Schenck v. United
States,58 which announced a powerful test of "clear and present danger" but administered it in a tiny and harmless dose at first.5 9) What
Gudridge brings to consciousness about Korematsu, however, is that in
Endo, decided the same day as Korematsu, the Supreme Court actually
struck down, largely on statutory grounds, the entire system of detention underlying the facts of Korematsu.60 And President Roosevelt accepted, even anticipated, the result in Endo. One day before the
Court released the opinions in Korematsu and Endo, upholding Korematsu's conviction but ordering Endo's release, the Secretary of War
announced the termination of the entire program. 61 The main controversy around that relationship seems to center on the apparent willingness of the Court to delay release of its opinion until the
Administration announced its opinion, although the Court may also
have wanted to delay the opinion until after the November 1944 elections. 62 One can only wonder what the Administration would have
done if Justice Black's Korematsu decision had been released a year
earlier, lending its support to the idea that racial exclusion was a
pressing public necessity.
It seems to me, then, that it is wrong to think of the courts as
powerless in wartime. True, they may lack the political power to order
the President to take steps he believes dangerous to the nation. (And
true, also, that what the President thinks dangerous to the nation may
be hard for him to distinguish from political embarrassment. One
important reason for secret military tribunals in Quifin seems to have
been the fear that it would be discovered that the Nazi saboteurs were
not really caught by the vaunted J. Edgar Hoover, but turned them55
56
57

See generally YAMAMOTO ET AL., supra note 50, at 155-57.
See GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 512-14 (9th ed. 2001).
See generally David Rabban, The Emergence of Modern First Amendment Doctrine, 50

U. CHI. L. REv. 1207 (1983).

58

249 U.S. 47 (1919).

59
60

Id. at 52.
See Gudridge, supra note 54, at 1947-53.

61
62

See PETER IRONS, JUSTICE
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selves in immediately, and not without some difficulty. 6,3 ) The important question about the Court's power requires the exploration of its
complex interaction with what Robert Post elegantly illuminates as
"constitutional culture." 64
The underlying problem of decisionmaking in wartime is the
confusion and uncertainty in almost all matters that accompany deep
disruption of the attitudes, judgments, and -culture that are necessary
to sift and weigh the monumental decisions that need to be made.
Was socialist pacifism a threat to the draft in World War I? Could
Nazis blow up railroads easily? Is al Qaeda actively planning the detonation of a dirty bomb? What is needed is not "will" or even "prudence," any more than randomly sacrificing civil liberties for the war
effort. What is needed is clarity. This is the true meaning of Robert
Jackson's dissent in Korematsu. The truth, as the Court saw it, was that
the President had to be given the run to make such decisions. Anything more than that, any effort to talk about the President's superior
knowledge or judgment, is not true and rapidly became another part
of the blinding fog. This way of looking at Jackson's position makes
sense of the seeming contradiction between his role as a Justice-the
courts, even real courts with preexisting jurisdiction, should not decide war cases-and as a Nuremberg prosecutor-pretend courts of
victorious armies should adjudicate them. As Justice Breyer has recently reminded us, Justice Jackson's driving motive at Nuremberg was
to make a record with clarity and precision to "'establish incredible
events by credible evidence." 65 The function of courts is to tell the
truth in times of crisis: it is the absence of this truth that prevents the
spirit of liberty from flourishing.
This way of looking at the role of the courts leaves many questions unanswered. In particular, it leaves unanswered the question of
how the political branches should value civil liberties if the courts
won't pretend to tell them. Oren Gross has recently explored that
question in a sustained argument that the political authorities should,
in some instances, act outside the law. 66 He conditions that power on
their acting frankly and being accountable after the emergency.
While I do not quarrel with his analysis (in fact I am in awe of it), we
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must be careful to distinguish the meaning of "unconstitutional" and

"unconstitutional in the view of the courts." Holding them accountable in the second sense will not be hard after the crisis. But it is holding them accountable in the first sense that is the way to the use the
creative power of war for human rights. As Daniel Farber has recently
argued, the true measure of Lincoln's greatness is found not by testing his will against Taney's judgment but by independently assessing
Lincoln's constitutional vision and its effects on our constitutional
67
culture.
In the unlikely event you follow me to this point, it becomes clear
why the hypothetical opinion I have described above would be deeply
wrong. There is a principled and easy basis for saying that the courts
do not have jurisdiction in a habeas case where the prisoner has been
detained outside the United States. (No coincidence that Eisentrager
was written by Robert Jackson.) The truth is that President Bush has
decided that this course of action is the right one: any purported exercise of jurisdiction only contributes to confuse that opportunity for
the spirit of liberty to show itself. Testifying before the Senate Judiciary Committee in December 2001, Attorney General John Ashcroft
said: "Charges of kangaroo courts and shredding the Constitution give
new meaning to the term 'fog of war.'"68 Indeed they do. The greatest danger of the fog of war is when some actors, especially those with
great power and responsibility, claim to see clearly while claiming that
others, especially their critics, are blinded by the fog. There is much
to be learned from the old sense of "fog of war," a term coined by von
Clausewitz, to apply to all actions taken by everybody. 69 The Court
cannot clear the fog but it can make sure that we see clearly that there
is a fog. As Archibald MacLeish wrote in an imagined dialog between
the astronomer Harlow Shapely and the poet Robert Frost:
Robert: You know where you are when you're lost.
Harlow: Where?
Robert: Lost.
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